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FLORIDA’S “BRAVE NEW WORLD”: THE TRANSITION FROM FRYE
TO DAUBERT WILL TRANSFORM THE PLAYING-FIELD FOR
LITIGANTS IN MEDICAL CAUSATION CASES
Erica W. Rutner and Lara Bueso Bach*
For nearly a century, Florida followed the Frye1 standard for admissibility of
expert testimony. However, on June 4, 2013, Florida Governor Rick Scott signed
into law House Bill 7015, amending Florida Statute section 90.702, and
transforming Florida into a Daubert jurisdiction. After a number of failed attempts,
Florida lawmakers finally succeeded in aligning Florida’s standards for expert
admissibility with the standards that govern in federal court and many states around
the country.2
While the transition from Frye to Daubert will undoubtedly impact all cases
utilizing expert testimony, as this article discusses, litigants relying on medical
causation testimony are likely to encounter some of the most significant changes.
That is because under Frye, Florida applied one of the most liberal admissibility
standards to medical causation testimony, essentially allowing for the admission of
this type of testimony without any judicial oversight.3 In contrast, Daubert requires
courts to act as “gatekeepers” in every case by independently assessing the
scientific reliability of the methodology, reasoning, and extrapolations underlying
an expert’s opinion.4 This article focuses on how these new standards, as
articulated by amended Florida Statute section 90.702 and applicable Supreme
Court precedent, will require far more rigorous scrutiny of medical causation
opinions than has traditionally been the case in Florida. Because Florida courts
have looked to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals for guidance in the past when
state and federal law are identical, this article also discusses the stringent criteria
the Eleventh Circuit has imposed under Daubert with respect to medical causation
opinions, and in particular, the types of data and methodologies it has deemed to be

________________________
*
Erica W. Rutner is a complex commercial litigation associate at Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP. Erica
received a B.A. summa cum laude from Barnard College in 2006, and a J.D. summa cum laude from the
University of Miami in 2009. Lara Bueso Bach is a complex commercial litigation associate at Weil, Gotshal &
Manges LLP. Lara received a B.A. summa cum laude from Rollins College in 2007, and a J.D. from the University
of Michigan Law School in 2010.
1.
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
2.
At the beginning of 2013, Florida was one of only ten remaining states still applying the Frye standard.
The other states that still apply Frye include: California, District of Columbia, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland,
Minnesota, New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington.
3.
See Stephen E. Mahle, The “Pure Opinion” Exception to the Florida Frye Standard, 86 FLA. B.J. 41,
41 (2012).
4.
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589–92 (1993).
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reliable—and unreliable—as a basis for inferring general causation.5 As the article
concludes, litigants across the state who rely on medical causation testimony
should be prepared to face a “brave new world”6 in preparing their cases and
defending their claims, especially because Daubert decisions in medical causation
cases are often dispositive.
I. THE FLORIDA LEGISLATURE ADOPTS THE STANDARDS DELINEATED IN
DAUBERT AND ITS PROGENY WITH RESPECT TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
EXPERT TESTIMONY
Frye requires that the scientific principles and methodology underlying an
expert’s testimony be generally accepted in the scientific community.7 House Bill
7015 explicitly rejects Frye and instead adopts the standards outlined in Daubert
and Federal Rule of Evidence 702.8 Specifically, the revisions to Florida Statute
section 90.702 effectuated by House Bill 7015 now require courts to ensure that:
(1) expert testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(2) expert testimony is the result of reliable principles and
methods; and
(3) the expert witness has applied the principles and methods
reliably to the facts of the case.9
While revised Florida Statute section 90.702 does not itself mention Daubert;
House Bill 7015 explicitly states that by amending the statute to pattern it after
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence as amended in 2000, “the Florida
Legislature intends to adopt the standards for expert testimony in the courts of this
state as provided in”10 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,11 General
Electric Co. v. Joiner,12 and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael.13 House Bill 7015
further provides that the Florida Legislature “no longer [intends to] apply the
standard in Frye v. United States, in the courts of this state.”14 Thus, pursuant to the
express mandates of House Bill 7015, the various principles outlined in Daubert
and its progeny should now govern the admission of expert testimony under
Florida law.
________________________
5.
General causation refers to “the question of whether the drug or chemical can, in general, cause the
harm plaintiff alleges,” whereas specific causation focuses on “whether the chemical caused the plaintiff’s specific
injury.” Hendrix ex rel. G.P. v. Evenflo Co., 609 F.3d 1183, 1196 (11th Cir. 2010).
6.
Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, on remand, described the new Daubert standard as
a “Brave New World.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. (Daubert II), 43 F.3d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir. 1995).
7.
See Castillo v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 854 So. 2d 1264, 1268 (Fla. 2003).
8.
See H.B. 7015, 2013 Leg., 115th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013).
9.
FLA. STAT. § 90.702 (2013).
10.
H.B. 7015, 2013 Leg., 115th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013).
11.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
12.
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
13.
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
14.
H.B. 7015, 2013 Leg., 115th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013) (citation omitted).
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II. THE APPLICATION OF REVISED FLORIDA STATUTE SECTION 90.702 IN
FLORIDA COURTS
While the Florida Legislature may have amended Florida Statute section
90.702, it is the Florida Supreme Court that is vested with the authority to adopt
rules of practice and procedure for the courts in Florida.15 The Florida Supreme
Court has yet to explicitly adopt the amendments;16 however, it appears that it
implicitly adopted the changes in Davis v. State17 and Perez v. Bell South
Telecommunications.18 Despite this implicit adoption of the changed rule, the
Florida Supreme Court has still not provided any guidance as to how Daubert
should be interpreted or applied. Nevertheless, Florida appellate and trial courts
have regularly begun to apply Daubert.19 Indeed, since the amended statute went
into effect, no published lower court decision has applied the Frye standard.
Instead, for example, in both Conley v. State and Perez v. Bell South
Telecommunications, the Florida appellate courts held that Daubert should apply to
expert testimony previously subject to a Frye analysis because the Florida
Legislature had adopted the Daubert standard during the pending appeal.20 The
Perez court reasoned that it “take[s] comfort . . . in the fact that the Florida
Supreme Court periodically adopts all legislative changes to the Florida Evidence
Code to the extent they are procedural.”21
While Conley remanded the case and ordered the trial court to apply Daubert,
the court in Perez took it upon itself to analyze and apply Daubert to the facts of
the case.22 Specifically, the court addressed the admissibility of the plaintiff’s
expert who sought to testify, based on his personal opinion, that the stress the
plaintiff experienced in the workplace caused her placental abruption and early
delivery of her child.23 The plaintiff argued that the testimony, which was excluded
by the lower court under Frye, should have been admitted under the “pure opinion”
exception espoused in Marsh (described in more detail in Section III, infra).24 The
court, however, rejected the plaintiff’s pure opinion argument and found that this
exception no longer applies in Florida,25 emphasizing that the “legislative purpose
________________________
15.
FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a).
16.
Notably, the Florida Supreme Court has stricken the references to Frye in the Florida Rules of Juvenile
Procedure. See In re Amendments to Fla. Rules of Juvenile Procedure, 123 So. 3d 1128, 1130 (Fla. 2013).
17.
Davis v. State, 142 So. 3d 867, 871–72 (Fla. 2014) (discussing revised section 90.702).
18.
Perez v. Bell S. Telecomms. Inc., No. SC14–1029, 2014 WL 5314497, at *1 (Fla. Oct. 16, 2014)
(declining jurisdiction over a case in which petitioner argued that the Third District Court of Appeal improperly
applied the Daubert standard); see also Zakrzewski v. State, No. SC13–1825, 2014 WL 2810560, at *1 (Fla. June
20, 2014) (holding that the Daubert standard should not be retroactively applied to the admissibility of the expert
testimony proffered during a proceeding that occurred nearly two decades ago).
19.
See Perez v. Bell S. Telecomms. Inc., 138 So. 3d 492, 497–99 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Conley v.
State, 129 So. 3d 1120, 1121 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013); Booker v. Sumter Cnty. Sherriff’s Office, 166 So. 3d 189,
194–95 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015); Giamo v. Fla. Autosport, Inc., 154 So. 3d 385, 387–89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2014).
20.
See Conley, 129 So. 3d at 1121; Perez, 138 So. 3d at 498.
21.
Perez, 138 So. 3d at 498 n.12 (citation omitted).
22.
See cases cited supra note 19.
23.
Perez, 138 So. 3d at 494–95.
24.
Id. at 496.
25.
Id. at 497.
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of the new law is clear: to tighten the rules for admissibility of expert testimony in
the courts of this state.”26 The court also explicitly relied on Eleventh Circuit case
law in finding that the expert’s opinion was merely his own personal opinion and
was not supported by any credible scientific research.27 Specifically, he had “never
before related a placental abruption to workplace stress and knew of no one who
had. There is no scientific support for this opinion. The opinion he proffers is a
classic example of the common fallacy of assuming causality from temporal
sequence.”28
Thus, it is clear that Florida appellate courts intend to apply Daubert pursuant
to the mandates of Florida Statute section 90.702, and they are likely to seek
guidance from Eleventh Circuit case law in doing so. Indeed, because the
amendments to Florida Statute section 90.702 are explicitly patterned after Daubert
and Federal Rule of Evidence 702, Florida courts are likely to rely on federal
courts, and the Eleventh Circuit in particular for guidance.29 As one Florida
appellate court put it, Florida courts have found it beneficial “to accord unusual
weight to a decision on [an] issue, if there is one, of the federal circuit in which the
state is located”30 because this “approach has the virtue of establishing that the
issue will be uniformly decided by both federal and state courts in the geographic
area in which the state is located; thus discouraging forum shopping.”31 Given this
preference, the remainder of the article focuses on the contrast between the liberal
admissibility standards that have traditionally applied in Florida with respect to
medical causation experts and the more rigorous standards that are now likely to
apply, as well as the Eleventh Circuit’s application of those principles in the
context of medical causation testimony.
III. THE COURT’S ROLE IN ASSESSING MEDICAL CAUSATION TESTIMONY
WILL BE TRANSFORMED UNDER DAUBERT AND SUBSEQUENT SUPREME COURT
PRECEDENT
The transition to Daubert will undoubtedly change the landscape of medical
causation testimony. As the Ninth Circuit explained in Daubert II, “judges ruling
on the admissibility of expert scientific testimony face a far more complex and
daunting task in a post-Daubert world than before.”32 At its most basic level,
Daubert no longer considers “general acceptance” the relevant inquiry in
determining the admissibility of an expert’s opinion.33 Rather, Daubert focuses on
________________________
26.
Id.
27.
Id. at 499.
28.
Id. (citing McClain v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1243 (11th Cir. 2005)).
29.
See Ward v. Atl. Sec. Bank, 777 So. 2d 1144, 1147 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (where state law is
“nearly identical” to federal law, “Florida courts will look to interpretations of the federal . . . law for guidance in
interpreting Florida’s . . . laws”); Phenion Dev. Grp., Inc. v. Love, 940 So. 2d 1179, 1184 n.5 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2006); see also Perez v. Bell S. Telecomms., Inc., 138 So. 3d 492, 499 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Eleventh
Circuit precedent in excluding plaintiff’s expert under Daubert).
30.
Wylie v. Inv. Mgmt. & Research, 629 So. 2d 898, 900 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
31.
Id.
32.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir. 1995).
33.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993).
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the reliability underlying an expert’s methodology: “the trial judge must ensure that
[expert testimony] is not only relevant, but reliable;” which entails “a preliminary
assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is
scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be
applied to the facts in issue.”34
Although the Florida Supreme Court has described Daubert as “a more lenient
standard” than Frye,35 the exact opposite is true when it comes to Florida’s
application of Frye in the context of medical causation testimony.36 Indeed, over
the last decade, the Florida Supreme Court has adopted an increasingly lenient
application of Frye as it pertains to medical causation testimony, amounting to
what some have described as a “let it all in standard.”37 However, as the Florida
appellate court in Perez noted, the transition to Daubert will “tighten the rules for
admissibility of expert testimony in the courts of this state.”38 As discussed below,
there are several reasons Daubert requires far greater scrutiny from judges in
assessing medical causation testimony, which is likely to result in greater
exclusions of causation experts than has traditionally been the case.
A. Under Daubert, Courts Must Act as “Gatekeepers” with Respect to All
Medical Causation Testimony
According to the Florida Supreme Court, judges were not required to conduct a
Frye analysis “in the vast majority of cases” because Frye “only applies when an
expert attempts to render an opinion based upon new or novel scientific
techniques.”39 This principle ultimately became the basis for the effective
abdication of judicial oversight with respect to medical causation testimony.40
Specifically, in Marsh v. Valyou,41 the court held that “an ordinary opinion on
medical causation [is not] a new or novel principle subject to Frye.” Instead, such
testimony is subject to the “pure opinion” exception to the Frye standard, which
provides that Frye is inapplicable to testimony that relies only on the expert’s
________________________
34.
Id. at 590–93.
35.
Brim v. State, 695 So. 2d 268, 271 (Fla. 1997).
36.
See id. at 271–72.
37.
See Mahle, supra note 3, at 43 (“A complete analysis of Frye and Daubert consumes volumes, but
positioning the [pure opinion exception] in the legal landscape reveals the fact that the [exception] constitutes a
large hole in the Frye standard, which further weakens the already lax Frye test.”). As another commentator put it:
In cases where a plaintiff needs the help of “junk science,” it is all too common for a Florida
resident, be it an individual or company, to be sued in a matter that chiefly involves an outof-state defendant primarily for the reason that the plaintiff’s attorney wants to prevent the
case from being removed to federal court because of a preference for Frye, which is
equivalent to no standard at all over Daubert.
Kenneth W. Waterway, A Plea for Legislative Reform: The Adoption of Daubert to Ensure the Reliability of Expert
Evidence in Florida Courts, 36 NOVA L. REV. 1 (2011).
38.
Perez v. Bell S. Telecomms., Inc., 138 So. 3d 492, 497 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
39.
U.S. Sugar Corp. v. Henson, 823 So. 2d 104, 109 (Fla. 2002) (emphasis added).
40.
See Mahle, supra note 3, at 44.
41.
Marsh v. Valyou, 977 So. 2d 543, 548 (Fla. 2007).
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personal experience and training.42 As the Marsh court reasoned, “experts routinely
form medical causation opinions based on their experience and training.”43
Notably, the Marsh court held that the testimony in that case, which causally linked
trauma to fibromyalgia, was not subject to any Frye analysis despite the fact that
“the precise etiology of fibromyalgia may not be fully understood,” and, as the
dissent pointed out, “the underlying theory of general causation is not accepted.”44
In fact, federal courts around the country have excluded similar expert testimony
linking trauma to fibromyalgia.45
In the wake of Marsh, Florida courts routinely applied the “pure opinion”
exception to abdicate any Frye analysis of the underlying basis for an expert’s
medical causation opinion, particularly in cases where the plaintiff’s causal theory
was still under investigation.46 For instance, in Andries v. Royal Caribbean
Cruises, Ltd., the Third District Court of Appeal of Florida admitted medical
causation expert testimony, based solely on the expert’s clinical observations—
despite the fact that the precise etiology of the disease at issue was unknown—on
the basis that “Marsh does not require scientific literature or other proof regarding
the precise etiology. . . . The fact that the precise causation is still under
investigation does not make the expert’s opinions in this case ‘new or novel.’”47
The court in Hood v. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. did the same, holding that an expert’s
opinion that Zicam caused the plaintiff to lose his sense of smell—which had been
uniformly rejected by federal courts across the country—was “pure opinion” that
was not subject to any Frye analysis.48
In contrast with this particularly lenient approach, the Daubert standard
requires courts to act as “gatekeepers” in all cases with respect to all expert
________________________
42.
See id. The pure opinion exception was first described by the Florida Supreme Court in Flanagan v.
State, which noted that “pure opinion testimony, such as an expert’s opinion that a defendant is incompetent, does
not have to meet Frye, because this type of testimony is based on the expert’s personal experience and training.”
Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827, 828 (Fla. 1993).
43.
Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 548.
44.
Id. at 550–62. The court also concluded that even if Frye were to apply, the testimony would still be
admissible because “numerous published articles and studies recognize an association between trauma and
fibromyalgia,” despite a “lack of studies conclusively demonstrating a causal link.” Id. at 550. See also infra
Section IV(B)(1) (discussing the admissibility of opinions based on associations).
45.
See, e.g., Vargas v. Lee, 317 F.3d 498 (5th Cir. 2003):
We conclude that the admission of [the expert’s] testimony was an abuse of discretion. We
do not, however, purport to hold that trauma does not cause fibromyalgia syndrome or that
the admission of expert testimony on that subject is permanently foreclosed. Medical
science may someday determine with sufficient reliability that such a causal relationship
exists. As the Supreme Court recognized in Daubert: “[I]n practice, a gatekeeping role for
the judge, no matter how flexible, inevitably on occasion will prevent the jury from learning
of authentic insights and innovations. That, nevertheless, is the balance that is struck by
Rules of Evidence designed not for the exhaustive search for cosmic understanding but for
the particularized resolution of legal disputes.”
Id. at 502 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993)).
46.
See Andries v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 12 So. 3d 260, 263 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009); Hood v.
Matrixx, Initiatives, Inc., 50 So. 3d 1166, 1175–76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v.
Thorne, 110 So. 3d 66, 72 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
47.
Andries, 12 So. 3d at 263–65.
48.
Hood, 50 So. 3d at 1175–76; Thorne, 110 So. 3d at 72.
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testimony.49 As the United States Supreme Court held in Kumho, Daubert
“imposes a special obligation upon a trial judge to ensure that any and all scientific
testimony . . . is not only relevant, but reliable . . . . [T]his basic gatekeeping
obligation applies . . . to all expert testimony.”50 In fact, consistent with this
principle, House Bill 7015 expressly abolishes the “pure opinion” exception to
expert testimony delineated in Marsh.51 Thus, the transition to Daubert will now
require Florida courts to assess the admissibility of all medical causation opinions
more rigorously in all cases.
B. Under Daubert, an Expert’s Opinion Must Be Based on More Than
Experience and Training
While Florida courts are expressly prohibited from applying the “pure opinion”
exception, it is clear that they also may not rely on the underlying basis for that
exception—i.e., an expert’s experience and training—as sufficient for admitting a
medical causation opinion under Daubert.52 Pursuant to the mandates of Daubert,
“[t]he subject of an expert’s testimony must be ‘scientific knowledge’ [which]
implies a grounding in the methods and procedures of science [and which]
connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation.”53 The Supreme
Court went on to explain that “[i]n order to qualify as ‘scientific knowledge,’ an
inference or assertion must be derived by the scientific method. Proposed
testimony must be supported by appropriate validation—i.e., ‘good grounds,’ based
on what is known.”54
To determine whether a specific methodology constitutes reliable “scientific
knowledge,” and is therefore admissible, the United States Supreme Court
suggested a non-exclusive list of relevant factors to consider, including: (1)
whether the expert’s theory can be and has been tested; (2) whether the theory has
been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of
error of the particular scientific technique; and (4) whether the technique is
generally accepted in the scientific community.55 As the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals noted in Daubert II, “something doesn’t become ‘scientific knowledge’
just because it’s uttered by a scientist.”56 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court
in Kumho specifically reinforced the fact that, at all times, the district court must
________________________
49.
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597.
50.
See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999) (emphasis added).
51.
H.B. 7015 states that “by amending s. 90.702, Florida Statutes, the Florida Legislature intends to
prohibit in the courts of this state pure opinion testimony as provided in Marsh v. Valyou, 977 So. 2d 543 (Fla.
2007).” H.B. 7015, 2013 Leg., 115th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013) (emphasis added).
52.
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.
53.
Id.
54.
Id.
55.
See id. at 593–94. Note that this is not to be construed as “a definitive checklist or test” because the
Daubert inquiry is a “flexible” one. Id.
56.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. (Daubert II), 43 F.3d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir. 1995) (emphasis
added); see also Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1316–13 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Under the regime of
Daubert, a district judge asked to admit scientific evidence must determine whether the evidence is genuinely
scientific, as distinct from being unscientific speculation offered by a genuine scientist.”).
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determine the reliability of an expert’s opinion, not merely the qualifications of the
expert who offers the opinion.57 In doing so, the court must “make certain that an
expert . . . employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that
characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.”58
C. Under Daubert, Courts Must Assess an Expert’s Application of a
Particular Methodology and Any Deductions or Extrapolations Made by
the Expert
Even as to those medical causation opinions to which Frye would apply,
Florida’s old regime left judges extremely limited in the type of assessment they
could conduct. Specifically, the Florida Supreme Court explained in U.S. Sugar
Corp. v. Henson, that Frye’s requirement of general acceptance only applied to the
general methodologies on which an expert relied, and that an “expert’s deductions
based thereon and opinions [do not need to be] generally accepted as well.”59 In
fact, the court “explicitly disapproved” any notion that the “opinion and deduction
themselves, must be generally accepted as a predicate for admissibility.”60 Thus,
the court held admissible medical causation testimony simply because the toxicity
of the agent at issue was generally accepted, without any inquiry as to the validity
of the deductions the expert made in opining that the agent was capable of causing
the plaintiff’s specific disease.61
In Castillo v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co.,62 the Florida Supreme Court
further narrowed the permitted assessment of medical causation testimony, holding
that the lower court “went beyond the requirements of Frye” by considering the
experts’ “extrapolation of the data from . . . admittedly acceptable experiments”
and their “application of the data generated from that science in reaching [their]
ultimate conclusion.”63 Instead, the Florida Supreme Court accepted the plaintiff’s
experts’ reliance on and extrapolation from in-vitro and animal studies simply
because those are “commonly accepted” scientific studies and methodologies—
without any assessment of the experts’ methods of applying and extrapolating the
data to reach their final causation conclusion.64
This approach stands in stark contrast to amended Florida Statute section
90.702 and United States Supreme Court precedent, which mandates that a court
________________________
57.
See, e.g., Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149 (1999); see also Rider v. Sandoz Pharm.
Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1197 (11th Cir. 2002) (in Kumho, the United States Supreme Court made it clear that
testimony based solely on the experience of an expert would not be admissible).
58.
Kumho, 526 U.S. at 152. Notably, the 11th Circuit has expressly enforced this principle in the context
of medical causation testimony, holding that “clinical experience, used alone . . . [is] insufficient to show general
causation.” Hendrix ex rel. G.P. v. Evenflo Co., 609 F.3d 1183, 1201 (11th Cir. 2010); see also Wilson v. Taser
Int’l, Inc., 303 F. App’x 708, 714 (11th Cir. 2008) (“A medical degree does not authorize [an expert] to testify [on
causation] when he does not base his methods on valid science.”).
59.
U.S. Sugar Corp. v. Henson, 823 So. 2d 104, 110 (Fla. 2002).
60.
Id. at 110.
61.
See id. at 109–10.
62.
Castillo v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 854 So. 2d 1264, 1276 (Fla. 2003).
63.
Id.
64.
Id.; see also infra Section IV(B)(6) (discussing the admissibility of an opinion based on animal
studies).
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assess an expert’s application of a particular methodology.65 Amended Florida
Statute section 90.702 expressly requires courts to ensure that the expert “has
applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.” Daubert
requires the same, noting that a court must do “a preliminary assessment of
whether the [expert’s] reasoning or methodology . . . properly can be applied to the
facts in issue.”66 Indeed, this principle is so fundamental to the Court’s assessment
that it formed the basis for the holdings in both Kumho and Joiner.67 Specifically,
in Kumho, the United States Supreme Court held that the issue before the trial court
was “not the reasonableness in general” of a particular methodology; “[r]ather, it
was the reasonableness of using such an approach . . . to draw a conclusion
regarding the particular matter to which the expert testimony was directly
relevant.”68 Thus, the Kumho Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the
expert’s opinions were sufficiently reliable simply because he had employed a
visual inspection method that is used by other experts; emphasizing that “the
question before the trial court was specific, not general . . . . [t]he particular issue in
this case concerned the use of [the inspection method] to draw” the particular
conclusions reached by the expert.69
The United States Supreme Court went even further in Joiner, holding that
courts must assess the extrapolations an expert makes in reaching his or her
conclusions:
[C]onclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one
another. Trained experts commonly extrapolate from existing data.
But nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence
requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected
to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert. A court may
conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between
the data and the opinion proffered.70
Consistent with this principle, the Joiner Court conducted the precise type of
analysis of medical causation testimony that the Florida Supreme Court had
foreclosed under Frye. Specifically, in addressing expert testimony causally linking
PCB exposure to cancer, the Court held that whether the types of studies relied on
by the plaintiff’s expert “can ever be a proper foundation for an expert’s opinion
was not the issue. The issue was whether these experts’ opinions were sufficiently
supported by the [specific] studies on which they purported to rely.”71 Thus, in
________________________
65.
See FLA. STAT. § 90.702 (repealed 2014).
66.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–93 (1993) (emphasis added); see also FLA.
STAT. § 90.702 (an expert witness may testify if “[t]he witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to
the facts of the case”).
67.
See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 153 (1999); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136,
145 (1997).
68.
Kumho, 526 U.S. at 153.
69.
Id. at 156–57.
70.
Joiner, 522 U.S. at 145.
71.
Id. at 144 (emphasis added).
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contrast with the court in Castillo—which accepted the plaintiff’s experts’ reliance
on and extrapolation from in-vitro and animal studies simply because those are
“commonly accepted” scientific studies and methodologies—the Court in Joiner
specifically assessed the experts’ extrapolations from the studies on which they
relied (which included animal studies) and ultimately concluded that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the experts’ extrapolations could
not reliably support their causation conclusions.72
IV. TO THE EXTENT ELEVENTH CIRCUIT PRECEDENT IS PERSUASIVE, THE
RELIABILITY OF A MEDICAL CAUSATION OPINION DEPENDS ON THE TYPES OF
EVIDENCE ON WHICH THE EXPERT RELIES
In addition to the Supreme Court precedent outlined above, Florida courts—
like the Third District Court of Appeal in Perez—are likely to find persuasive the
well-developed body of Eleventh Circuit case law that has applied Daubert to
medical causation expert testimony. Specifically, because experts must employ the
same intellectual rigor that scientists in the field employ when investigating a
causal link between an agent and a disease, the Eleventh Circuit has found that
certain types of evidence can form the basis for a reliable causation opinion while
other types of evidence cannot.73 Many of these types of evidence are well
described in the Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, which is the leading
reference source for federal judges in issues involving scientific testimony.74 To the
extent Florida courts look to the Eleventh Circuit for guidance, it is critical that
plaintiffs seeking to offer medical causation testimony heed these guidelines in
order to withstand the heightened statutory standard.
A. Scientifically Reliable Methods for Establishing Causation
1. Epidemiological Studies
The Eleventh Circuit has held that epidemiological studies are “the best
evidence of causation in toxic tort actions” and are, therefore, a scientifically
reliable method for establishing general causation.75 Epidemiological studies (such
as case control studies, cohort studies, and cross-sectional studies) have designs
________________________
72.
Id.
73.
Note that the Eleventh Circuit recognizes that toxic tort cases fall into two categories: (1) cases in
which the medical community generally recognizes the toxicity of the drug or chemical at issue; and (2) cases in
which the medical community does not. McClain v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 2005).
The first category—with respect to which a court need not undertake an exacting Daubert analysis—is very
narrow, limited to situations “where the reliability of an expert’s methods is properly taken for granted,” and
“medical doctors routinely and widely recognize [causation] as true, like cigarette smoking causes lung cancer and
heart disease, too much alcohol causes cirrhosis of the liver, and that the ingestion of sufficient amounts of arsenic
causes death.” Id. at 1239 n.5.
74.
Barbara J. Rothstein & Ralph J. Cicerone, Forward to REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE,
at ix (3d ed. 2011).
75.
Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1198 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Hendrix ex rel. G.P. v.
Evenflo Co., 609 F.3d 1183, 1197–98 (11th Cir. 2010).
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and controls that allow an expert to determine whether there is an increased
association between an agent and a disease.76 It must be emphasized, however, that
when epidemiological studies do not yield “statistically significant results,”77 they
may not supply an adequate foundation for a causation opinion.78 Moreover, in
order to be admissible, an expert must explain “how the findings of those studies
may be reliably connected to the facts of the particular case.”79
As an example, in Rider v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp., none of the four
epidemiological studies presented by plaintiffs contained statistically significant
results linking Parlodel to stroke.80 In the absence of statistically significant
epidemiological studies, the court demanded alternative proof of medical
causation.81 But as discussed infra, the remaining evidence the plaintiff
presented—case
reports,
animal
studies,
FDA
findings,
and
dechallenge/rechallenge—were all similarly unreliable.82
2. The Dose-Response Relationship
Another reliable method for establishing causation is through evidence of the
dose-response relationship, which is the “relationship in which a change in amount,
intensity or duration of exposure to an agent is associated with a change—either an
increase or decrease—in risk of disease.”83 In other words, an expert should be able
to opine as to how much is too much. The Eleventh Circuit has held that the doseresponse relationship is the “hallmark of basic toxicology” and “the single most
important factor to consider in evaluating whether an alleged exposure caused a
specific adverse effect. . . . [An] expert who avoids or neglects this principle of
toxic torts without justification casts suspicion on the reliability of his
methodology.”84
This principle was discussed at length in McClain v. Metabolife International,
Inc., where the Eleventh Circuit found that an expert’s testimony was suspect and
ultimately unreliable because the expert could not determine the dose of Metabolife
required to injure the plaintiff or anyone else.85 The court observed that:
Often low dose exposures—even for many years—will have no
consequence at all, since the body is often able to completely
________________________
76.
See Green et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
549, 556–57 (3d ed. 2011) [hereinafter Reference Manual].
77.
Rider, 295 F.3d at 1198; see also Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1315 (11th Cir.
1999).
78.
See Rider, 295 F.3d at 1198.
79.
Hendrix, 609 F.3d at 1196–97.
80.
See Rider, 295 F.3d at 1198.
81.
See id. at 1202.
82.
See generally id. at 1199–201 (excluding the evidence as speculative, and the theory to be unreliable,
because it did not support the hypothesis it was offered to prove).
83.
McClain v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1241–42 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Reference
Manual, supra note 76, at 622).
84.
Id. at 1242; see also Kilpatrick v. Breg, Inc., 613 F.3d 1329, 1339 (11th Cir. 2010).
85.
See McClain, 401 F.3d at 1241–43.
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detoxify low doses before they do any damage. Furthermore, for
most types of dose-response relationships following chronic
(repeated) exposure, thresholds exist, such that there is some dose
below which even repeated, long-term exposure would not cause
an effect in any individual.86
In McClain, however, the expert continually testified that any amount of
Metabolife was dangerous, contradicting basic toxicological principles and thus
casting doubt on his testimony.87
3. Background Risk
Yet another method for reliably establishing causation is through evidence of
the background risk of the disease.88 This is the risk that members of the general
public have of suffering the disease without exposure to the challenged product and
the additional risk that those exposed to the product have of suffering the disease.89
Without this information, it is difficult to determine whether any incidence of the
disease is anything more than coincidence.90 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit has held
that “a reliable methodology should take into account the background risk” and that
in the absence of any evidence that exposure to the product causes additional risk
of the disease, the court “must assume” that no such risk exists.91
The court in McClain explained the usefulness of this methodology:
[I]t would help to know how much additional risk for heart attack
or ischemic stroke Metabolife consumers have over the risks the
general population faces. If ephedrine or an ephedrine/caffeine
combination do not increase the incidence of heart attack and
ischemic stroke in persons who ingest it, as opposed to all those
who do not and still have heart attacks and strokes, that fact would
reduce the likelihood that Metabolife harmed Plaintiffs. Likewise,
if Plaintiffs could show that taking Metabolife increases the risk of
heart attack and ischemic stroke beyond the usual incidence of
these common diseases, that would support their methodology in
this case.92

________________________
86.
Id. at 1242 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
87.
See id. at 1243.
88.
Id.
89.
Id.
90.
See id. at 1244.
91.
McClain, 401 F.3d at 1243–44; see also Kilpatrick v. Breg, Inc., 613 F.3d 1329, 1342 (11th Cir. 2010)
(concluding the expert’s failure to take into account background risk “place[s] the reliability of [his] conclusions in
further doubt”).
92.
McClain, 401 F.3d at 1244.
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Plaintiffs’ experts admittedly did not know the background risk of the disease and,
as a result, the court assumed it did not exist.93
4. Physiological Mechanism
Finally, “[a]n expert’s opinion will likely also survive Daubert if the expert
described the physiological process, derived by the scientific method, by which a
particular cause leads to the development of a given disease or syndrome.”94 The
physiological or biological mechanism depends upon the existing state of the
science as it involves “knowledge about the cellular and subcellular mechanisms
through which the disease process works.”95 As discussed infra, animal studies
suffer from a number of limitations, but they can be useful in demonstrating the
physiological mechanism.96 The Eleventh Circuit has held that an expert who does
not offer evidence of the physiological mechanism lacks one of “the underlying
predicates of any cause-and-effect medical testimony.”97 Although the Eleventh
Circuit has not addressed the notion of physiological mechanism at length, the
Reference Manual suggests that in cases where the biology of a disease is not well
understood, hypothesized physiological mechanisms may be accepted.98
B. Scientifically Unreliable Methods for Establishing Causation
Although no specific type of evidence is required to reliably prove general
causation, the Eleventh Circuit has found that experts who failed to rely on any of
the aforementioned types of evidence did not employ a reliable methodology in
reaching their causation opinions.99 Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit recently stated that
epidemiological studies, knowledge of the dose-response relationship, and
background risk of the disease are methodologies that are “indispensable to
proving the effect of an ingested substance.”100 In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit
has explicitly foreclosed various types of evidence from reliably establishing

________________________
93.
See id.
94.
Hendrix ex rel. G.P. v. Evenflo Co., 609 F.3d 1183, 1197 (11th Cir. 2010).
95.
Reference Manual, supra note 76, at 605.
96.
See id. at 563.
97.
McClain, 401 F.3d at 1253 (quoting Black v. Food Lion, Inc., 171 F.3d 308, 314 (5th Cir. 1999)).
98.
See Reference Manual, supra note 76, at 605.
99.
See, e.g., Chapman v. Procter & Gamble Distrib., 766 F.3d 1296, 1308 (11th Cir. 2014) (affirming the
exclusion of causation testimony based on case reports, animal studies, FDA recommendations, and a differential
diagnosis as unreliable); McClain, 401 F.3d at 1251, 1255 (affirming the exclusion of causation testimony based
on chemical analogies, case reports, adverse event reports, FDA recommendations, dechallenge/rechallenge data,
and a differential diagnosis as unreliable); Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1201–03 (11th Cir.
2002) (affirming the exclusion of causation testimony based on case reports, dechallenge/rechallenge data,
chemical analogies, animal studies, and FDA findings as unreliable); Kilpatrick v. Breg, Inc., 613 F.3d 1329,
1336–40 (11th Cir. 2010) (affirming the exclusion of causation testimony based on case reports and case studies,
literature reporting an association between the agent and the disease, animal studies, in-vitro studies, and a
differential diagnosis as unreliable).
100.
See, e.g., Chapman, 766 F.3d at 1308.
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general causation—in many cases, the very same types of evidence the Florida
Supreme Court had held acceptable under Frye.101
1. Literature Reporting a Potential Association
The Eleventh Circuit has held that “[s]howing an association is far removed
from proving causation.”102 As defined by the Reference Manual, “[a]n association
between exposure to an agent and a disease exists when they occur together more
frequently than one would expect by chance.”103 Mere association, however, does
not rise to the level of a causal relationship.104 Issues such as sampling errors,
confounding, or bias can make it appear that an association exists.105 For these
reasons, the court in Kilpatrick v. Breg noted, where “all of the articles [relied on
by the plaintiff’s expert] merely stated potential associations . . . the literature [the
plaintiff’s expert] based his conclusions upon was insufficient to create a reliable
methodology which passes Daubert muster.”106
This stands in stark contrast with Marsh and subsequent lower court decisions.
Marsh held that even if subject to Frye, the expert testimony in that case was
admissible simply because “numerous published articles and studies recognize an
association between trauma and fibromyalgia.”107 The Fourth District reiterated
this principle in Hood v. Matrixx, noting that a medical causation opinion is
admissible so long as “the scientific literature recognizes an association or possible
etiology between a medical condition and a predicate event.”108
2. Causation Conclusions That Go Beyond the Conclusions Reached
by Authors in the Field
The Eleventh Circuit has held that an expert does not utilize a reliable
methodology if he or she makes “unauthorized conclusions from limited data—
conclusions the authors of the study d[id] not make,” because that shows a “lack of
scientific rigor.”109 As the McClain court explained, where the authors of published
research “limit the conclusions authorized from their study by saying that it does
not prove causation . . . [this] demonstrates the intellectual rigor in this field of
science, an intellectual rigor that is conservative and does not leap to specific
conclusions about causation or toxicity from incomplete evidence or broad
________________________
101.
See id. at 1311.
102.
Kilpatrick, 613 F.3d at 1338 (quoting Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1315 n.16 (11th
Cir. 1999)).
103.
Reference Manual, supra note 76, at 566.
104.
See id.
105.
See id. at 568.
106.
Kilpatrick, 613 F.3d at 1341.
107.
Marsh v. Valyou, 977 So. 2d 543, 550 (Fla. 2007) (emphasis added).
108.
Hood v. Matrixx Initiatives Inc., 50 So. 3d 1166, 1175 (Fla. 2010).
109.
McClain v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1248 (11th Cir. 2005); see also Gen. Elec. Co. v.
Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 145 (1997) (“Given that [the authors] were unwilling to say that PCB exposure had caused
cancer among the workers they examined, their study did not support the expert’s conclusion that Joiner’s
exposure to PCB’s causes his cancer.”).
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principles.”110 Again, this is a significant departure from Florida Supreme Court
precedent. In Marsh, all three studies on which the plaintiff’s expert relied
concluded that more research was needed to determine whether trauma causes
fibromyalgia, and that the existing data was insufficient to establish a causal
relationship.111 Yet, the Marsh court held that this evidence was sufficient under
Frye to the extent it applied, noting that “calls for further research do not preclude
admission of the testimony.”112
3. Case Reports and Adverse Event Reports
The Eleventh Circuit has also made clear that general causation may not be
inferred based solely on case reports or adverse event reports because “such studies
lack control and thus do not provide as much information as controlled
epidemiological studies do.”113 A case study is a medical account of a particular
patient or group of patients, but it “reflect[s] only reported data, not scientific
methodology. Some case reports are a very basic form report of symptoms with
little or no patient history, description of course of treatment, or reasoning to
exclude other possible causes.”114 As a result, “[c]ausal attribution based on case
studies must be regarded with caution.”115 As the court in McClain held, “case
reports raise questions, they do not answer them.”116 Similarly, adverse event
reports are simply “uncontrolled anecdotal information that [offer] one of the least
reliable sources to justify opinions about . . . causation.”117 This too appears to be
inconsistent with the approach Florida courts have taken under Frye. As the dissent
pointed out in Marsh, the majority of the articles suggesting an association in that
case were “case reports and anecdotal accounts.”118 The same appears to be true of
the published articles the expert relied on in Andries v. Royal Caribbean Cruises,
Ltd.119
4. Differential Diagnosis
The Eleventh Circuit has explained that a differential diagnosis—i.e., a method
whereby a physician identifies the cause of a plaintiff’s condition through the
elimination of potential alternative causes—is used only after general causation is

________________________
110.
McClain, 401 F.3d at 1248.
111.
See Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 568.
112.
Id. at 550.
113.
Kilpatrick v. Breg, Inc., 613 F.3d 1329, 1338 (11th Cir. 2010).
114.
Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1199 (11th Cir. 2002).
115.
Kilpatrick, 613 F.3d at 1338.
116.
McClain v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1254 (11th Cir. 2005); see also Hendrix ex rel. G.P.
v. Evenflo Co., 609 F.3d 1183, 1197 (11th Cir. 2010) (case reports by themselves are “insufficient to show general
causation”).
117.
McClain, 401 F.3d at 1250.
118.
Marsh v. Valyou, 977 So. 2d 543, 567 (Fla. 2007).
119.
See Andries v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 12 So. 3d 260, 263 (Fla. 2009).
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established; it is not a substitute for reliable proof of general causation.120 In other
words, a differential diagnosis cannot “overcome the [plaintiffs’ experts’]
fundamental failure to lay the scientific groundwork” for their causal theory
through the application of scientifically valid methodologies.121
Here too, Florida Supreme Court precedent has long held to the contrary,
allowing for the admission of causation testimony simply if it is based on the
generally accepted differential diagnosis technique. Specifically, in U.S. Sugar
Corp., the Florida Supreme Court held that “there is no question that the
differential diagnosis technique . . . is generally accepted in the scientific
community” and thus it is not necessary that “the expert’s deductions based thereon
and opinion also be generally accepted.”122 The Florida Supreme Court again
emphasized this principle in Marsh, holding that differential diagnosis is not a new
or novel scientific test subject to Frye.123
5. Temporal Relationship
In the same vein, courts in the Eleventh Circuit have held that a temporal
relationship is not ordinarily sufficient to prove a causal relationship.124 A temporal
relationship exists when a person is exposed to a substance and thereafter
experiences injury.125 It is often the starting point for investigating the cause of an
injury in clinical practice; but drawing a causation conclusion from this
relationship “leads to the blunder of the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy.”126 This
fallacy—literally translated to “after this, because of this”—assumes causality from
a mere temporal sequence, and standing alone, “is entitled to little weight in
determining causation.”127
6. Unreliable Extrapolations
As discussed in Section II(C) supra, Daubert requires that courts assess the
basis for any extrapolations an expert makes in reaching his or her conclusions. In
________________________
120.
See Chapman v. Procter & Gamble Distrib., 766 F.3d 1296, 1308 (11th Cir. 2014); Hendrix, 609 F.3d
at 1202 (holding that differential analysis could not prove that traumatic brain injury caused plaintiff’s autism
because experts did not first prove that traumatic injury can, in general, cause autism); Kilpatrick, 613 F.3d at
1342 (differential diagnosis “assumes the existence of general causation”).
121.
Hendrix, 609 F.3d at 1195. Indeed, an expert’s application of the differential diagnosis method does
not, by itself, even render a specific causation opinion reliable. Rather, “the reliability of the method must be
judged by considering the reasonableness of applying the differential etiology approach to the facts of this case
and the validity of the experts’ particular method of analyzing the data and drawing conclusions therefrom.” Id.
122.
U.S. Sugar Corp. v. Henson, 823 So. 2d 110, 110 (Fla. 2002); see also Gelsthorpe v. Weinstein, 897
So. 2d 504, 510–11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that “the use of the technique differential diagnosis by an
expert medical witness in determining causation does not raise concerns under Frye. Differential diagnosis is an
established scientific methodology . . . [that] is generally accepted in the scientific community.”).
123.
See Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 549.
124.
See McClain v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1243 (11th Cir. 2005).
125.
See Craig T. Smith, Peering into the Microscope: The Rise of Judicial Gatekeeping After Daubert and
its Effect on Federal Toxic Tort Litigation, 13 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 218, 242 (2007).
126.
McClain, 401 F.3d at 1243.
127.
Id. at 1254.
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light of that mandate, the Eleventh Circuit has routinely excluded medical
causation opinions based on unsupported extrapolations.128 For instance, the
Eleventh Circuit has rejected extrapolations from: (a) studies regarding different
substances;129 (b) studies regarding different diseases;130 (c) animal studies;131 and
(d) in-vitro studies.132 While these types of data are not per se invalid, an expert
cannot simply presume they are sufficient without providing a scientifically
reliable basis for his or her extrapolations. In particular, relying on animal and invitro studies in a reliable manner under Daubert requires that the expert
demonstrate how the test results would transfer to a human subject.133 In contrast,
unexplained extrapolations from these types of data were held to be sufficient
under Florida’s application of Frye, as extrapolation was considered a “commonly
accepted methodology,” the basis of which courts were prohibited from
assessing.134
7. Weight of the Evidence
Although the Eleventh Circuit has yet to address the reliability of the so-called
“weight of the evidence” or “totality of the evidence” methodology, it bears
mentioning in this article because plaintiffs in toxic tort cases have begun to
routinely rely on this approach in the absence of any of the aforementioned reliable
methodologies. Specifically, weight of the evidence is a methodology employed by
regulatory and advisory agencies in conducting risk assessment analyses.135 At its
most basic, it is an analysis as to whether, in the “aggregate,” the evidence cited by
the expert “presents a stronger scientific basis” for finding causation than when the

________________________
128.
See FEDERAL MOTIONS IN LIMINE § 5:7 (2014).
129.
See McClain, 401 F.3d at 1246 (finding that the expert improperly relied on extrapolations from studies
regarding different drugs in the same class because “even minor deviations in chemical structure can radically
change a particular substance’s properties and propensities” and the expert had “failed to show that the [drug]
analogy is valid or that differences in chemical structure . . . make no difference”).
130.
See Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1202 (11th Cir. 2002) (noting that the plaintiff’s
experts’ extrapolations from evidence regarding a different disease than the one at issue were an unsupported “leap
of faith”).
131.
See id. (holding that the expert could not reliably extrapolate the results of animal studies to humans
because “what happens in an animal would not necessarily happen in a human being” and the plaintiffs had not
offered a rationale that, in the context of what was being studied, animals and humans were sufficiently similar to
justify the extrapolation).
132.
See Kilpatrick v. Breg, Inc., 613 F.3d 1329, 1341 (11th Cir. 2010) (noting that experts cannot
extrapolate from the results of in-vitro studies unless the expert can “state how their test results would transfer
when conducted on live human subjects”).
133.
See id.; see also Rider, 295 F.3d at 1202.
134.
Castillo v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 854 So. 2d 1264, 1278 (Fla. 2003).
135.
See, e.g., Allen v. Pa. Eng’g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 198 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that “weight of the
evidence” is a method used by “[r]egulatory and advisory bodies such as IARC, OSHA and EPA . . . to assess the
carcinogenicity of various substances in human beings and suggest or make prophylactic rules governing human
exposure”); Magistrini v. One Hour Martinizing Dry Cleaning, 180 F. Supp. 2d 584, 602 (D.N.J. 2002) (noting
that “weight of the evidence” is a methodology “recognized by the United States Environmental Protection
Agency as well as the Internal Agency for Research of Cancer,” in which “the quality and adequacy of the data
and the kinds and consistency of responses induced by a suspected carcinogen” are considered).
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evidence is considered individually.136 The Middle District of Florida has described
the method as “reviewing the totality of the literature . . . including studies in which
the authors found no evidence of a causal connection,” then “appl[ying] a
generally-accepted set of guidelines to the evidence,” and finally “arriving at [the]
conclusion that the weight of the evidence support[s] a causal connection.”137
Courts have grappled with the “weight of the evidence” methodology. It is an
amorphous concept and, in employing this approach, “reasonable scientists may
come to different judgments about whether such an inference [of causation] is
appropriate.”138 Despite this limitation, the First Circuit Court of Appeals, in
Milward v. Acuity Specialty Products Group, Inc., held that “weight of the
evidence” can be “a scientifically sound and methodologically reliable foundation”
for a causation opinion and that the admissibility of such an opinion “must turn on
the particular facts of the case.”139 In Milward, the plaintiff’s expert utilized
“weight of the evidence” to establish that benzene caused a rare leukemia.140 In
doing so, the expert relied on a large body of reliable evidence to form his
causation opinion, such as epidemiological studies, case-control studies, and near
consensus among governmental agencies.141
On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has rejected this
methodology as per se unreliable because it requires a threshold that is too low for
judicial use.142 In Allen v. Pennsylvania Engineering, Corp., the court rejected the
use of the weight of the evidence methodology to demonstrate a link between a
chemical, known as ethylene oxide, and brain cancer because, at bottom, the
experts had relied on epidemiological evidence that was merely suggestive of
causation but not statistically significant.143 The experts thus could not circumvent
the frailties of their scientific evidence by simply aggregating unreliable pieces of
evidence.144 Both the Eighth and Tenth Circuits have also rejected the use of this
methodology for similar reasons.145 Given the Eleventh Circuit’s particularly
rigorous scrutiny of causation expert testimony, we suspect that if presented with
the question, they will follow the approach adopted by the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth
Circuits.
________________________
136.
Glastetter v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 252 F.3d 986, 992 (8th Cir. 2001); see also Caraker v. Sandoz
Pharm. Corp., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1040 (S.D. Ill. 2001) (“Whether, in aggregate, the evidence cited supported
an inference that would enable plaintiffs’ experts to offer an admissible causation opinion.”).
137.
In re Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 6:06-MD-1769-ORL-22D, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15653, at
*159 (M.D. Fla. June 23, 2009).
138.
Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prods. Grp., Inc., 639 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir. 2011).
139.
Id. at 17.
140.
Id. at 17–20.
141.
See id.
142.
See Allen v. Pa. Eng’g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 196 (5th Cir. 1996).
143.
See id. at 196–98.
144.
See id. at 198.
145.
See Hollander v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 289 F.3d 1193, 1216 n.21 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that the
“weight of the evidence” methodology is “inconsistent with Daubert. To suggest that those individual categories
of evidence deemed unreliable by the district court may be added to form a reliable theory would be to abandon
the level of intellectual rigor of the expert in the field.”) (internal citation omitted); see also Glastetter v. Novartis
Pharm. Corp., 252 F.3d 986, 992 (8th Cir. 2001) (rejecting expert testimony that relied on case reports, medical
treatises, a handful of human “rechallenge” and “dechallenge” events, dissimilar animal studies, internal company
documents, and FDA recommendations).
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V. CONCLUSION
Regardless of whether Florida state courts look to Eleventh Circuit case law for
guidance in applying Daubert, it is clear that Daubert and its progeny will
themselves usher in a “brave new world” for litigants who rely on medical
causation testimony. The principles expressed by the Eleventh Circuit in the
context of medical causation cases only further manifest the new landscape that
Florida litigants are facing under Daubert. Indeed, while the regime of Frye has
rendered Florida judges extremely limited in their ability to keep junk science and
unreliable expert testimony out of the courtroom, the amendments to Florida
Statute section 90.702 now compel far more scrutiny of medical causation
testimony than has ever been the case. As the Eleventh Circuit explained in Allison,
“[w]hile meticulous Daubert inquiries may bring judges under criticism for
donning white coats and making determinations that are outside their field of
expertise, the Supreme Court has obviously deemed this less objectionable than
dumping a barrage of questionable scientific evidence on a jury.”146
Attorneys around the state should be prepared for these imminent changes.
Expert testimony can make or break any type of case requiring proof of medical
causation—such as a products liability or toxic tort litigation. Indeed, not only do
juries place a great deal of reliance on expert witnesses in cases such as these, but
plaintiffs are unlikely to even get to a jury in the first place without offering
admissible expert witness testimony as to causation.147 As a result, the transition to
Daubert will likely bring a significant increase in the number of challenges made
to medical causation experts, and that has the potential to impact the success that
plaintiffs experience in litigating these types of cases.

________________________
146.
Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1310 (11th Cir. 1999).
147.
See, e.g., Marsh v. Valyou, 977 So. 2d 543, 545 (Fla. 2007) (holding that the admissibility of expert
testimony was the determining issue as to whether the defendant was entitled to the entry of summary judgment).
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